Enhancing horizon scanning by utilizing pre-developed scenarios : analysis of current practice and specification of a process improvement to aid the identification of important 'weak signals' by Rowe, Emily et al.
Rowe, Emily and Wright, George and Derbyshire, James (2017) 
Enhancing horizon scanning by utilizing pre-developed scenarios : 
analysis of current practice and specification of a process improvement 
to aid the identification of important 'weak signals'. Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change. ISSN 0040-1625 (In Press) , 
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/61436/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
 Enhancing Horizon Scanning by utilizing pre-developed scenarios: analysis of current practice and 
specification of a process improvement to aid the identificatLRQRILPSRUWDQWµZHDNVLJQDOV¶ 
 
Abstract 
This paper documents the Intuitive Logics scenario planning process and its relationship 
with horizon scanning activity in order to evaluate the separate and joint usefulness of 
these methods for anticipating the future. The specific objectives of this paper are to: (i) 
identify and differentiate scenario planning and horizon scanning methodologies (ii) 
discuss & evaluate their analytic underpinnings, and (iii) critically appraise their 
separate and combined value and effectiveness in relation to enhancing organizational 
preparedness for the future. Our analysis culminates with specifications to (iv) enhance 
the identification of ¶weak signals¶ in Horizon Scanning by utilizing a systematically 
broadened range of both negatively-valenced and positively-valenced scenario 
storylines. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Foresight activities are designed to push the boundaries of human perception and engender long-term critical 
thinking as individuals envision desired states, formulate strategies to address the consequences of current 
actions, and identify and avoid negative futures (Slaughter, 1995). In order to anticipate important shifts and 
events, organizations must continuously scrutinize and have deep knowledge of the driving forces that influence 
environmental changes, and better understand the associations, dynamics and interactions between these 
(Martelli, 2014). Similarly, they must be able to identify emergent patterns still in the infancy of their 
emergence, separating out those considered to signal important future changes from those merely representative 
RIUDQGRPQHVVRUµQRLVH¶+owever, while it is therefore essential to consider and prepare for futures for which 
there is some present evidence, and for which presently-existing driving forces might therefore be identified, it 
is also important to consider potential futures which are not leaving any evidential trace in the present ± the 
latter being the most profound source of uncertainty, representing so-FDOOHGµXQNQRZQXQNQRZQV¶ 
 
Scenario Planning (SP) is a strategic foresight tool that is designed to explore and anticipate change, by 
FKDOOHQJLQJSODQQHUV¶EHOLHIVDQGSHUFHSWLRQV(Ringland, 2006; Schwartz, 1996; Van Der Heijden et al., 2002). It 
is claimed that the approach has many cognitive, strategic and competitive advantages (Meissner and Wulf, 
2013; Postma and Liebl, 2005; Ramirez et. al., 2013). SP facilitates a consideration of the future that is 
embedded in present evidential circumstances, but does not confine consideration of the future to a 
straightforward projection of these present developments as, for example, forecasting might. Instead, it 
facilitates consideration of how developments that begin in present evidential circumstances might play out in 
different ways such that present circumstances are transformed in some way, leading to a future that is very 
different from the present (Derbyshire and Wright, 2017). 
 
Horizon Scanning (HS) also eschews the attempt to create projections of the future; it instead aims to 
continuously and objectively explore, monitor and assess current developments and their potential implications 
for the future (Miles and Saritas, 2012). The HS approach has been integrated with the scenario planning 
approach to engender continuity and give on-going purpose to scenario narratives (Ramirez et al., 2013; 
Schoemaker et al., 2013). Practitioners argue that their integration provides greater benefits, enhances 
preparedness and increases value for organizations, than does either in isolation. The present paper seeks to 
evaluate these claims by providing a review of scenario planning and horizon-scanning processes in order to 
determine their individual and combined success and value in practice. 
 
The paper concludes by setting out an approach to HQKDQFH WKH LGHQWLILFDWLRQ RI ¶ZHDN VLJQDOV¶ in Horizon 
Scanning by utilizing a systematically broadened range of both negatively-valenced and positively-valenced 
scenario storylines, leading to a fully combined and integrated scenario planning and horizon scanning approach 
to consideration of the future. Essentially, the scenario process is used to identify potential weak signals that 
might be presently evidenced through horizon scanning if the scenario were indeed representative of an 
emergent, potential future.  
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2. Scenario Planning 
2.1. Intuitive Logics 
Scenario planning (SP) is a collaborative process to envision alternative future environments, articulate their 
implications, test the logic of long term plans, strategies and policies 2¶%ULHQ HW DO  5LQJODQG 
Schwartz, 1996) and, ultimately, prepare for impending change, using plausible and consistent narratives about 
the future (Porter, 1998). In this view, a single scenario gives one view of the future - whereas multiple 
scenarios depict a number of prospects and deepen the focus, expression and understanding of possible changes 
and developments )RWUHW DO2¶%ULHQHW DO6FKZDUW]. By considering multiple possible 
scenarios, recognition is given to the indeterminate and emergent nature of the future, in contrast to forecasting-
based approaches to consideration of the future, which often simply extrapolate on the basis of present and past 
trends. 
 
The Intuitive Logics (IL) approach to SP is without dispute the most used and documented scenario approach. 
According to Martelli (2001), the majority of practitioners favour this approach as it is flexible, capable of 
identifying emergent patterns, generates new ideas, makes use of any available information about the future, and 
can be used in any organization, context or setting.  In its many methodological variations, the approach can be 
conducted in as few as six steps (Ringland, 2006, 2002, 1998; Schwartz, 1996), or as many as fourteen (Godet, 
 2¶%ULHQ HW DO , with some activities focusing purely on scenario development and others 
emphasizing the additional development of strategies that are robust against the range of constructed scenarios. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The IL approach is usually conducted in a workshop setting and, according to Martelli (2014), there are as many 
ways to conduct the IL approach as there are practitioners. Despite this, there are some common activities that 
are performed in the process 2¶%ULHQ HW DO  5LQJODQG  6FKZDUW] . These are graphically 
depicted in Figure 1: 
 
Problem Definition:  In this stage, the purpose of the SP exercise is defined and participants brain-storm to 
identify key uncertainties and pre-determined elements of the future. 
 
Scenario Development: In this stage, planners derive themes to outline scenario logics and develop reliable and 
credible descriptions of events by causally linking the driving forces in a plausible and consistent manner. This 
is seen as the heart of the scenario process, since strategy development and future plans hinge on the credibility 
of scenario narratives. 
 
Strategy Development: After scenario development, planners evaluate current and in-development strategy 
against the developed scenarios. The entire process is designed so that, at every stage, participants¶ perceptions 
are challenged. 
 
2.2. Perspective-broadening effects from scenario planning 
Practitioners and academics imply a host of cognitive, communicative and cultural benefits that result from the 
use of scenarios, arguing that it encourages organizational change by leveraging different opinions to create a 
shared view of the present and future (Mason and Herman, 2014; Schoemaker, 1995; Van Der Heijden, 2005). 
SP is professed to improve awareness as it promotes strategic thinking in terms of systems and interactions 
(Martelli, 2001), raises complex questions and discussions (Van Der Heijden, 2005; Fink et al. 2004), fosters 
creative foresight to rethink strategies and plans; especially in times of accelerated or anticipated changes 
2¶%ULHQHWDO, helps organizations cope with sudden shifts by accumulating knowledge and integrating 
it into the future actions (Vacík et al., 2014; Peterson et al., 2003); by allowing them to leverage internal 
resources, competencies and capabilities, especially if an unfavorable future were to materialize, reduce 
cognitive biases, enhance organizational learning, and improve the quality of decision making (Haeffner et al., 
2012; Meissner and Wulf, 2013; Bradfield, 2008; Schoemaker, 1993) by emphasizing the need for flexibility in 
uncertain environments. 
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2.3. Potential perspective-narrowing effects from scenario planning 
 
According to Mintzberg (2003), and in contrast to the implied positive effects discussed above, SP can limit an 
RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V ability to be responsive as it encourages managers to observe and wait for pre-conceived events 
to unfold; thus an organization and its managers may be unable to recognize and act on unexpected changes that 
have not been considered, limiting ability to prepare for the future. If the organization perceives that the future 
will only unfold according to their derived scenarios, then there may be increased vulnerability to surprise 
events (Mason and Herman, 2014; Ringland, 2002), ZKLFKLVWKHRSSRVLWHRI63¶VLQWHQGHGSXUSRVH+HUH the 
organizational focus may be on the most likely or favored scenario. So, instead of opening minds and 
perceptions, SP interventions can act to narrow views of the future (Derbyshire and Wright, 2014; Neugarten, 
2006). Further, the identification of essential components of the scenarios (driving forces, uncertainties and 
trends) can be influenced by the  VFHQDULR GHYHORSHUV¶ most recent experiences (Wright and Cairns, 2011; 
Wright et al.6FKRHPDNHU5LQJODQG2¶%ULHQ et al., 2007; Derbyshire and Wright, 2014), 
leading to so-FDOOHG µUHFHQF\ELDV¶. The result may be easily conceived but unsurprising scenarios that do not 
consider a broad range of futures. Indeed, most writers agree that a quality SP process is dependent on the 
facilitator¶V skills (Giaoutzi and Sapoio, 2013; Martelli, 2001) and the ability to recognize when bias from recent 
experiences will influence SP activities. 
 
In an effort to address some of the aforementioned issues, practitioners have sought to combine the SP method 
with other techniques. The focus in recent times has been on those techniques that can enhance the purpose and 
continuity of SP initiatives. One such technique is horizon scanning, to which we now turn. 
 
3. Horizon Scanning 
 
3.1. The Strategic Early Warning System and weak signals 
 
The use of Horizon Scanning (HS) LV LQWHQGHG WR GHYHORS DQ RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V capability for identifying subtle 
environmental changes, allowing organizations to cultivate a high awareness and understanding of their 
environment, leading to a quick and effective response to changes and events (Miles and Saritas, 2012). While 
there is no current consensus on the exact meaning of the term µKRUL]RQVFDQQLQJ¶, Garnett et al. (2016) describe 
HS as the comprehensive and systematic examination of risk, uncertainty and emerging trends, in order to 
reframe perceptions and identify implicit and explicit assumptions about the future. 
 
The origins of HS lie in environmental scanning, strategic foresight and Ansoff's (1975) Strategic Early 
Warning System (SEW). Strategic foresight activities aim to envision future states, and identify emergent trends 
at an early stage of their emergence, as-well-as giving consideration to the implications of present actions and 
decisions on future events (Slaughter, 1995). In particular, the SEW system is intended to aid strategic foresight 
activities by identifying µweak signals¶. $ µZeak signal¶ is an ambiguous, seemingly unimportant or 
unexceptional trend that can considerably impact DQ RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V aims and objectives, but requires correct 
interpretation (Godet, 1994); after interpretation it then becomes an early warning signal (Lesca and Lesca, 
2011). Weak signals are not easily identified or appropriately interpreted (Derbyshire, 2016; Tessun, 1997; Fink 
et al., 2004). It follows, then, that the ability to identify and correctly interpret the implications of weak signals 
is crucial to horizon scanning, its efficacy as a tool to aid consideration of the future being dependent on this 
ability. 
 
Authors sometimes use WKHWHUPVµenvironmental VFDQQLQJ¶(6 and µhorizon scanning¶ synonymously, or view 
the latter as a subset of the former (Miles and Saritas, 2012); however, there are some key differences between 
the two. ES LVFRQFHUQHGZLWKPRQLWRULQJDQGSHUXVLQJDQLQVWLWXWLRQ¶Vcurrent macro-level environment - i.e., 
the political, economic, social, technological, natural and legal, and competitive landscape - for changes, trends, 
opportunities and threats (Choo, 2002). ES is an ongoing process, where departments uncover and share recent 
or upcoming developments with the wider group. ES usually supports short-term decision making as its primary 
objective is usually to acquire industry specific and competitive information (Choo, 2002; Miles and Saritas, 
2012; Ramírez and Selsky, 2014). 
 
By contrast, HS adopts a long-term orientation to probe novel concerns and emerging driving forces within a 
future context (Miles and Saritas, 2012); for this reason it is considered a foresight activity (Schoemaker et al., 
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2013). Like SP, practitioners claim its true value lies in enhancing the µcognitive agility¶ of planners by 
extending long-term thinking and exploring future developments (Marsh et al., 2014). 
 
3.2. The Horizon Scanning process 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The HS process is mostly data driven and entails noticing changes (Neugarten, 2006), gathering information and 
evidence on these developments, interpreting and validating the findings and using them to make informed 
decisions and policies (Marsh et al., 2014). HS practitioners employ bespoke means of organizing and 
interpreting the information they gather to enhance organizational knowledge. As with SP, there is no agreed-
upon standard methodology. However, even with the differing approaches, there are common activities that are 
performed within the process and these activities are depicted in Figure 2: 
 
Exploration: The first phase and entire process involves exploration via continuous information gathering, 
monitoring and scanning of the external environment. This activity can be automated, web-based or manually 
conducted in workshops or brainstorming sessions. Upon noticing changes, developments or perceived weak 
signals, managers will focus their attention on WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V FRQFHUQV associated with these changes, 
organizing, prioritizing and managing information to determine what is pertinent to the perceived issues. During 
this process, relevant information is transformed into evidence that is used to assess the key issues and concerns. 
 
Assessment: In this second phase, planners must go beyond what is known or assumed about the issue to clearly 
assess the value of the evidence and its implications for the future. 
 
Application: This phase involves disseminating the outcome of the assessment phase to aid in foresight 
activities, strategy and policy creation or revision, risk analysis and decision making. The results of HS are often 
used in periodic updates or annual reports to inform the organization of drivers of change, inhibitors and 
enablers of future objectives, emerging research themes and research topics that lead to new areas of enquiry 
(Garnett et al., 2016).  
  
The final stage requires the organization to continue the HS activities to continually enhance organizational 
knowledge and the decision-making process. But, as Cunha et al. (2006) explain, as time passes, organizational 
knowledge has temporary validity and so contemporary strategic plans and understandings of the environment 
can become unrelated. As such, all planning and monitoring needs to be a continuous, integrated process so that 
current strategies and decisions reflect current and probable developments. 
 
3.3. Criticisms of the Horizon Scanning Approach 
 
A criticism that has been levelled at HS is that it is an unsystematic process that eventually leads to information 
overload and so, in actuality, adds little in value to organizational knowledge (Schoemaker et al., 2013). Herbert 
Simon noted that a wealth of information inevitably means a dearth of something else - a scarcity of whatever 
information consumes; and what information consumes is attention (Simon, 1971). Large amounts of 
information do not necessarily translate into a higher-level of knowledge for this reason; the production of 
knowledge from information requires that a VLJQDO LV VLIWHGRXW IURP PHDQLQJOHVV µQRLVH¶ (Silver, 2012). The 
more information available, the more difficult this becomes. Kahneman (2013, p.241) has shown how humans 
are not very good at this sifting task, and WKDWVWDWLVWLFDODOJRULWKPVµJUHDWO\RXWGR¶ humans at it, especially in 
information-rich environments. Statistical algorithms are PRUH OLNHO\ WKDQ KXPDQV WR LGHQWLI\ µZHDNO\ YDOLG
FOXHV¶ (Kahneman, 2013, p.241; Makridakis and Bakas, 2015). Taleb (2001) similarly noted the human tendency 
to identify patterns in data, even where none exist. 
 
How, then, can important but, at present, weakly-indicated signals be recognised? And how can the human 
tendency to see spurious patterns in information be avoided? Postma & Liebl (2005) suggest searching for 
something without knowing what it is and where to find it. Based on Postma & Liebl's (2005) view, this is like 
finding a legendary artefact; it may be valuable, but that value can only be appraised by those with the skill, 
knowledge and expertise to do so. Yet, such an approach is likely to exacerbate the tendency to identify spurious 
and meaningless patterns. Schultz (2006) contends that the identification of a weak signal is an µentirely 
judgemental pursuit¶ with little or no guidance to justify identification, yet this too is likely to leave us 
susceptible to the same danger of misidentification. Furthermore, even if correctly identified, the importance of, 
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and actions towards the signal need to be understood and initiated within an organizational context that is, in any 
event, likely to be concerned with current day-to-day problems and issues (Hodgkinson and Wright, 2002; 
Wright and Cairns, 2011). 
 
Indeed, ZKDW PD\ EH UHIHUUHG WR DV µorganizational receptiveness¶ LV D IXQGDPHQWDO SUREOHP DQG RQH WKDW
renders the correct identification of weak signals highly problematic. The information gathering component of 
the HS process is quite straightforward; but organizations must develop capabilities to sort through the noise 
surrounding the key information that is generated. Ramirez et al. (2013) explain that as informational sources 
increase, so do the number of µpotentially relevant¶ issues and concerns identified within it. Moreover, 
conflicting information renders it challenging to justify strategic and operational adjustments (Ilmola and Kuusi, 
2006). The result can be µinformation paralysis¶ ± either over-analysis of trivial findings or under-analysis of 
important findings (Schoemaker et al., 2013). 
 
The exploration and assessment phases in HS are also highly subjective, and are prone to the cognitive bias of 
selectively discarding or retaining information that either support current EHOLHIVRUGLVFRQILUPRWKHU¶VEHOLHIV
about future developments (Cunha et al., 2006; Wright and Cairns, 2011; Meissner and Wulf, 2013). HS 
operatives tend to be low in the organizational hierarchy and may face issues of lack of insight into, and 
awareness of, VHQLRUPDQDJHUV¶FRQFHUQV 
 
What these many difficulties bring into question is the ease with which the signal and the noise can be separated 
in HS, so as to identify important weak signals. Day and Schoemaker (2004) suggest the solution to this 
SUREOHP WR EH VWURQJ µSHULSKHUDO YLVLRQ¶ The notion was introduced to management theory in 2003 and has 
since amassed a great deal of attention in strategic planning and foresight. 
 
Conceptually, these authors argue that in order to understand relevant developments and become more 
responsive to the ever-FKDQJLQJ EXVLQHVV HQYLURQPHQW RUJDQL]DWLRQV QHHG WR µLPPHUVH WKHPVHOYHV LQ WKH
SHULSKHU\¶VLQFHHYHQWVWKDWDUHRXWVLGHRIDQRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VIRFDOLQWHUHVWVPD\KDYHWKHJUHDWHVWLPSDFWRQLWV
survival (Haeckel, 2004; Neugarten, 2006). Authors emphasize parallels between human visual capabilities and 
those of an organization, referring to blind-spots, 20/20 vision, active and passive vision and attentional 
blindness (Neugarten, 2006). It is important to recognize that objects in the visual periphery are ambiguous, 
blurred and distorted; however, when attention is directed towards the object, it becomes clear and more easily 
interpreted. The theory espouses that this also applicable to organizations, since shifting their focus towards 
events on the periphery brings them into focus, but creates blind spots and obscurities in other directions (Day 
and Schoemaker, 2004). However, tKLVYLHZSRLQWHVSHFLDOO\ZLWKUHVSHFWWRµEOLQG-VSRWV¶ZKLFKDUHDNH\WKHPH
in peripheral theory, assumes that an organization is like an individual with limited attentional capabilities. 
Attentional resources are always bounded and never infinite (Simon, 1971), meaning that focus applied in one 
GLUHFWLRQLQHYLWDEO\UHGXFHVIRFXVDSSOLHGLQDQRWKHU,QGHHG+HUEHUW6LPRQ¶VFRQFHSWRIµERXQGHGUDWLRQDOLW\¶
is a key one in this regard. 
 
Practically, the organization must scan and evaluate distant or seemingly unrelated external events, that are 
beyond their traditional environment ± events that may lead to potentially advantageous or problematic 
situations (Neugarten, 2006; Sarpong and Amankwah-Amoah, 2015). The objective is to broaden an 
RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VDZDUHQHVVDQDFWLYLW\WKDWUHTXLUHVSUDFWLVHDQGUHOLHVRQMXGJHPHQW(Day and Schoemaker, 2005, 
2004). In organizations, peripheral visioning can entail engaging in seemingly unrelated, non-standard activities. 
For example, the US Army developed a free online computer game to gain insight into identifying, screening, 
training potential candidates. At the time, the method was questioned as it was, at first, seen to be a trivial and 
unrealistic means of adding knowledge to the army; but the programme had several unforeseen benefits. Tens of 
thousands of players passed the virtual bootcamp and completed more than one hundred million tactical 
missions that allowed strategists to observe the tactics of the best players and use them to develop new strategies 
for street warfare or close combat situations (Brown, 2004). Thus, this peripheral activity and its resultant 
benefits become salient to the US Army. It is, though, unknown whether such peripherally-focused concern and 
activity is a standard procedure within the US Army. In our view, identification of such peripheral signals ± 
even when observers are sensitized to the importance of the underlying issue - requires creativity and often, 
perhaps, luck. We will return to this issue in the section 6.1 of this paper. 
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4. Comparative Analysis of Scenario Planning and Horizon Scanning processes 
 
When the SP & HS processes are juxtaposed similarities become apparent (see Figure 3). Both the IL approach 
to SP and the HS activity typically commence with a brainstorming session in which stakeholders share ideas 
and views to define the focal issue. This is often the viability of the focal organization over a pre-defined time-
period in the case of the IL approach to SP or, for HS, is often a key revenue-generating activity of the focal 
organization. Both SP and HS approaches identify/consider the drivers (i.e., trends or critical uncertainties) in 
the external environment that can impact the focal issue, and then use these drivers as the basis for identifying 
particular signals of change (Garnett et al., 2016). Within the IL SP process, the identified uncertainties are 
organized according to both degree of importance and degree of predictability and then used as the framework 
for scenario development. In the HS process, a stage occurs in which particular change-related information is 
gathered, over time, on particular set of driving forces. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The second phase of both activities involves using perceptions and judgment to consider the impact of possible 
future events on the focal issue of concern. HS uses perceptions as a means of interpreting current developments 
and their implications for the future, whereas the IL SP approach can be characterized by thinking-through the 
relationships between driving forces in order to develop relatively independent clusters that preserve both time 
precedence and causal influence/impact. An important difference here might therefore be that the basis for 
thinking about the future in HS is current developments in terms of how identified driving forces are presently 
playing out and bringing change, albeit they are still at an early stage of their unfolding. In SP, by contrast, the 
uncertain way in which driving forces are assumed to interact and play out is not necessarily based on current 
developments, and how the identified driving forces are playing presently, thereby giving freer range to consider 
future possibilities not currently manifest in present empirical trends or causal patterns. The implication is that 
HS used in isolation only allows for consideration of those parts of the state space of all possible futures 
currently leaving an empirical trail in the forms of weak signals and emergent combinations of causes. SP, by 
contrast, allows for a broader consideration of this state space, giving free range to imagine causes that are not 
manifesting themselves empirically in the present.  
  
In the third phase, those facilitating scenario interventions in organizations often turn to aid the development of 
robust strategies - strategies that perform well across the range of constructed scenarios. By contrast, in this 
phase, horizon scanners disseminate what they deem as relevant findings to others (often more senior) in the 
organization - perhaps to be utilized in other foresight activities, which could, in fact, include a scenario 
planning exercise or could simply be giving consideration to policy/strategy in a less-structured way. Thus, HS 
is explicitly expected to be an on-going process; whereas SP activities can have varying agendas and may be a 
one-off rather than continuous process. 
 
We turn now to a consideration of how SP and HS can be better integrated so as to provide a holistic 
consideration of the future that allows room for both consideration of possibilities not presently based on 
empirically-observable trends or causes, leading to a more global robustness, and consideration of potential 
futures that are leaving a present empirical trace in the form of weak signals and sets of observable causes. By 
combining SP and HS, a combined local and more global robustness can be better achieved than is achievable 
through the use of either one in isolation.  
 
5. Integration of Scenario Planning and Horizon Scanning 
 
Fink et al. (2004) claim that SP can play a significant role in organizing and prioritizing HS processes, since SP 
can (i) set the context for subsequent HS, and (ii) define the scope and extent of the environmental monitoring 
system. Conversely, HS activities provide scenario interventions with a continuing organizational purpose ± 
allowing SP to become an organizational activity that is used to integrate HS activity outputs (Schoemaker et al., 
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2013). Furthermore, HS can act as a means to evidence created scenarios, ensuring they have relevance to 
current circumstances and strategy, rather than simply providing an opportunity for blue-sky thinking about a 
distant future devoid of any present applicability. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
HS is, after the stage of selecting particular weak signals to be monitored, often focused on the collection of 
objective data that is linked to these signals, in comparison to the largely judgmental approach of IL SP. HS 
therefore allows for the empirical evidencing of the possibility for created scenarios to transpire, based on 
changes already underway, which can be useful for galvanising the attention and resource needed to action any 
important insights that may have emerged. Often, HS web-based systems allow continuous data and information 
retrieval so organizations can capture and monitor developments in real-time, and adjust policies and strategies 
in light of those changes (Garnett et al., 2016; Miles and Saritas, 2012). Such web-based systems can assist in 
dealing with the problem, highlighted earlier by reference to Kahneman (2013), in which there is clear 
superiority for statistical algorithms in terms of identifying still weakly-emergent patterns in comparison to 
human judgement. Where human judgement still prevails over machine-learning, however, is in the ability to 
conceive of futures which are completely different to that which presently exists, and which may not, therefore, 
have any evidential basis in the present. The SP approach is more organic and subjective and provides a context 
for discussion and interpretation of perceived changes and developments, allowing for consideration of just such 
futures, but the SP process does not, by itself, establish a system to monitor current or likely developments in 
relation to these imagined futures, in order to monitor if they represent genuine future possibilities. This can be a 
factor that hinders SP, as an isolated intervention, from being an on-going process. 
 
Indeed, 63¶V MXGJHPHQW DQG VXEMHFWLYH DSSURDFK DQG LWV OLPLWHG HPSLULFDO EDVLV - albeit incorporating 
identification of plausible causal chains - represents an important advantage over HS. As noted earlier, 
Mintzberg (2003) suggests that SP encourages managers to observe and wait for identified, pre-conceived 
events to unfold, meaning they may be unable to recognize and act on unexpected changes, limiting their ability 
to prepare for the future. The implication is that SP can have a perspective-narrowing effect that is the opposite 
of that intended. However, based on the above discussion, it is clear that this tendency is perhaps even more 
likely in relation to HS than SP; SP, because of its partly non-empirical, subjective and judgmental basis, allows 
greater opportunity to consider futures that have less basis in current information, but for which an internally-
consistent and plausible set of causes can be described. 
 
7KH SUREOHP ZLWK +6¶ HPSLULFDO EDVLV LQ ZKLFK LGHQWLILHG WUHQGV LQ WKH IRUP RI ZHDN VLJQDOV DUH WKHn 
interpreted and become early warnings, is the likelihood that such an exercise will focus attention on the 
identified potential futures which can be evidenced, at the expense of those left unconsidered, which cannot be 
evidenced because they do not have any present objective basis. HS places emphasis on the identification of pre-
existing futures, by which is meant futures which are already partly emergent, such that they are leaving an 
evidential trace which is presently detectable, albeit in only weak form. Whereas a characteristic of many focal 
systems of interest on which HS and SP is carried out is the tendency for disjuncture or step changes to occur, 
which represent a break from the past and current trajectory. By contrast, the trends identified in HS represent 
exactly that ± the current trajectory of a system, and are QRWWKHUHIRUHQHFHVVDULO\UHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKHV\VWHP¶V
trajectory subsequent to a step change which renders it qualitatively different from previous trends. IL SP, when 
enhanced by the use of recent augmentations designed to deal with the problem of determinism, can assist with 
this problem. We later highlight how one such augmentation, the Backwards Logic Method, can be particularly 
useful in this regard when combined with HS. 
 
5.1. Integration of Scenario Planning and Horizon Scanning in Practice  
A review of extant literature was conducted to identify studies that suggest or illustrate the integration of SP & 
HS in practice. The first step was to gather and survey existing scholarly work on SP, HS, weak signals and 
EWS. This involved an extensive search for scholarly peer-reviewed journal articles from the Business Source 
Complete, Emerald Insight, Science Direct and ProQuest databases. The search covered a twenty-year time 
period, however, during the search it was discovered that the bulk of horizon scanning literature emerged 
between 2004 and 2013, with the most popular years of SP & HS joint initiatives being 2011 and 2012. Specific 
search terms included horizon scanning, scenario planning, weak signals and variations such as, scenario 
thinking, scenario-based approach, strategic planning and early warning, to name a few. A total of one hundred 
and thirty-six papers met this criteria and were in the subject areas of business and management, technology, 
health and public policy. A number of the articles are from the journals of Futures, Long Range Planning, 
Foresight, Technological Forecasting & Social Change and Science & Public Policy.  
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The second step was to determine whether the article was relevant to the review by excluding articles that did 
not contain keywords in the body of the text, as some were only mentioned in the references, footnotes and 
appendices, or discuss HS or SP, or use SP methods in HS activities. During this process, the articles were 
coded and classified based on their context, research type, methods, profession of the authors, mode of analysis, 
information sources, whether they contained all the primary keywords and whether they provided advice on the 
identification of forward indicators, weak signals or any potential future trends in HS.  
 
Twenty-two studies met the inclusion and exclusion criteria and explicitly suggest or illustrate the use or 
integration of SP & HS. Table 1 provides a brief summary of the findings, their case example, suggested or 
applied context, methodology and whether they were conducted by an academic, practitioner or a joint venture 
between the two. They provide varying degrees of advice on the identification of weak signals in HS, ranging 
from simply acknowledging this step must occur before evaluating future plans, strategies or policies, to detailed 
descriptions and protocols on how to facilitate this process.  
 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Oliver Schwarz (2005) and Schoemaker, Day & Snyder (2013) argue that detecting weak signals is achieved by 
scanning the organizational environment; where Schoemaker, Day & Snyder (2013) add that µa good way to 
select a signal and fast-forward its development is through scanning the environment and the use of scenario 
planning or other future-PDSSLQJ WHFKQLTXHV SJ ¶.RYiĜtNRYi 	 *URVRYi  DOVR DIILUP VFHQDULR-
based identification, but highlight that the identification of weak signals is based on the scenarios created and 
how they are influenced by personnel and the perception of the analyst; therefore, they emphasize that different 
attributes must also be recognised which are in line and beyond their own knowledge and experience (pg. 35).  
 
Most scholars follow a line of argument which suggests diversity, discontinuity and environmental disturbances 
are key to identifying weak signals. They contend that the process of identification should be conducted in a 
participatory environment that represents a variety of competences or viewpoints, but that it more importantly 
draws on several diverse sources of information to accurately anticipate discontinuities or disruptive dynamics 
(Habegger, 2010; Miles and Saritas, 2012; Schultz, 2006; van Rij, 2012, 2010; Weber et al., 2012).  
Accordingly, in the Big Picture study, Saritas & Smith (2011) conducted a survey at the 2008 Future-oriented 
Technology Analysis (FTA) Conference of foresight practitioners with varying degrees of experience about 
potential and existing weak signals; and in Boe-/LOOHJUDYHQ	0RQWHUGH¶VFDVHVWXG\RQ&LVFR6\VWHPV
Inc WKH LGHD ZDV WR HVWDEOLVK D µnetwork of technology scouts to provide early identification of novel 
technologies and trends and to enable informed strategic decision-making and to help stimulate innovation (pg. 
¶.  
 
Out of the twenty-two studies, six provided some level of detail on the identification of weak signals, where 
each of them suggested or used web-based approaches combined with expert opinions, collaborative workshops, 
crowdsourcing, network analysis and interviews which are all underpinned by scenario narratives. Amanatidou 
et al. (2012) suggests that prior to the identification of weak signals, planners must differentiate between 
exploratory and issue-centred modes of HS; where exploratory scanning focuses RQ µemerging issues from a 
wide variety of data and different signal sources and expert interviews, while the issue-centred approach 
concentrates on identifying core docXPHQWV DQG QDUUDWLYHV SJ ¶. They advocate a primarily web-based 
approach, since µthe identification, processing and analysis of weak signals and emerging issues requires the 
help of various leveOVRIDXWRPDWLRQ«DZHOO-defined methodological framewoUNDQGSURIHVVLRQDOVFDQQHUV¶
who are assisted by expert panels and reviewers.  
 
Palomino et al. (2012b) and Ramírez et al. (2013) follow a similDUDSSURDFK7KHIRUPHUVWDWHVµthat emerging 
trends, opportunities and constraints are identified via formal meetings, such as conferences and workshops, and 
LQIRUPDOQHWZRUNLQJVXSSOHPHQWHGE\PDWHULDOREWDLQHGIURPWKHOLWHUDWXUHDQGPHGLD«WKHVHDUHSXWLQWRWKH
web-based Horizon Scanning System (HSS) (pJ ¶, monitored, and the outputs are then periodically 
communicated in the form of newsletters or reports. The latter conducted a comparative case study between 
Nokia and Statoil, they directly link HS with the output of a prior SP activity which is taken to drive the 
subsequent identification and monitoring of weak signals. They derived pre-set categories from the scenarios 
and used them to collect and track qualitative and quantitative signals, from various sources such as the internet, 
news, company reports, consumer surveys and employee opinions, which are then continuously monitored and 
also compiled into periodical reports. In their study, they stressed that the changes and developments in each 
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category must be systematically tracked and interpreted to determine which µscenarios had become more likely 
as a rHVXOWRIWKHVLJQDOVSJ¶ Garnett et al. (2016) compiled a database from workshop sessions, as this 
ZDVµcritical to arriving at a shared view of potential drivers of change within the polLF\HQYLURQPHQWSJ¶ 
and combined this with network analysis and web-based approaches to derive potential weak signals.  
 
Pang et al. (2010) and Kayser (2016) look to social media and suggest that Twitter is a rich data source for 
capturing, identifying and analysing future changes and disruptions, especially by targeting the monitoring of 
IXWXULVWV¶ WZHHWV 6FKRHPDNHU HW DO  DUH PRUH LQIRUPDWLYH DERXW WKH GHWDLOV RI WKH PHFKDQLFV RI WKHLU
approach as they also use online networks such as FutureMonitor to crowdsource potential future trends; 
however, they are vague on the focal identification issue and simSO\VWDWHWKDWWKHµradar system is continuously 
fed by organizational sensors that monitor known indicators as well as by scanning for unexpected signals (Pg. 
¶ 
 
Finally, Tessun (1997), Rossel (2011) Palomino et al. (2012) do not provide any details on the identification of 
weak signals in HS activities, they simply acknowledge that organizations must identify these subtle trends; and 
Ilmola and Kuusi (2006) present a framework and case study for filtering weak signals in strategic decision 
making, but do not address the identification of weak signals; their research assumes that they are previously 
known. Table 3 summarises the extant advice on the identification of weak signals. 
  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
To summarize, the need to consider both potential futures that do currently have an evidential basis in the 
present on the one hand, alongside the need to consider futures that do not have such a presently-existing 
evidential basis, implies that HS and SP are more powerful when used in combination than in isolation. But, to 
revert to our discussion and analysis above, all of the current invectives and recommendations will lead to either 
(i) an unfocussed or (ii) a focussed but naive assessment of possible futures ± since the identification of weak 
signals will either be happenstance or limited to those prompted by the already-developed scenarios.  
 
In the final section of this paper, we show how using SP to imagine particular futures without reference to 
whether they have any current evidential basis, but then thinking in a backwards fashion to the implied present-
day evidence that would suggest their plausibility, followed by a gathering of this evidence through HS, can 
provide for both an open and unconstrained (by current circumstances) consideration of the future. We set out 
our recommended combined approach to HS and SP through adaptation of the Backwards Logic Method for SP, 
followed by incorporation of aspects of HS. 
 
 
6. The Backwards Logic Method (BLM) for Scenario Development and its use with 
Horizon Scanning. 
 
The BLM method stands in marked contrast to the basic IL scenario development method. In the conventional 
IL scenario development method, the procHVVRIVFHQDULRGHYHORSPHQWLVµforward cKDLQLQJ¶. By this we mean 
that the process requires workshop participants to generate driving forces (using the PESTEL dimensions of 
Politics, Economics, Societal, Technological, Environmental and Legal) that may impact the issue of concern ± 
often the viability or continued survival of an organization. Once these driving forces have been elicited, the IL 
process goes on to aid the identification of causal linkages between these forces ± represented by arrows of 
influence. Each arrow acts to mark time precedence and causality ± in that a driving force that is placed at the 
start of an arrow of influence comes earlier in time and exerts a causal influence on the outcome of the 
subsequent driving force. The next step in the IL process is to identify those clusters of driving forces that are 
most significant ± in terms of both the impact of the out-turns of a cluster on the focal organization and in terms 
of the degree of predictability of the outcome of a particular cluster. The two clusters that are rated as the most 
uncertain and the most impactful become the basis for the development of the subsequent set of scenarios. 
Wright and Cairns (2011) give full, step-by-step, detail on the IL scenario development process. Note at this 
point that the scenarios that are developed have a causal, time precedence basis within the two significant 
clusters but note also that the earlier-in-time stating points of a cluster - WKDW LQLWLDWH D FOXVWHU¶V VXEVHTuent 
unfolding -  cannot be identified before the IL scenario development process is initiated. As such, the scenarios 
that are developed follow no particular prescription ± beyond a requirement that the out-turns of each focal 
driving force are different from one another, yet plausible. 
 
By contrast, the Backwards Logic Method for scenario development starts with a focus on the objectives of the 
focal organization and asks workshop participants to imagine both an extreme (but plausible) negative 
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achievement and an extreme (but plausible) positive achievement of these objectives. The next step in the 
SURFHVVLVWRDVNZRUNVKRSSDUWLFLSDQWVWRLPDJLQHE\³EDFNZDUGFKDLQLQJ´WKHFDXVHVDQGFDXVDOFKDLQLQJRI
these extreme developments. Table 3 compares and contrast the basic IL method with the BLM. 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
This BLM process can be easily adapted to aid identification of important - in terms of the viability of the focal 
organization ± early warning signals of extreme negative or positive futures. In short, an augmentation of the 
backwards logic method (BLM) for scenario development, set out in step-by-step fashion below, gives us a 
solution to the difficulty of identifying weak signals of important futures: 
 
Step 1 - Identify the objectives that the organization wishes to achieve through its activities. For profit-seeking 
organizations, commonly-held objectives are: improved market share, improved short-term profitability, 
improved cash-flow, improved long-term profitability, improved return on investments, etc. For non-profit-
seeking organizations, commonly-held objectives might include: enhanced public awareness of issues, greater 
access to the political arena, long-term commitment to action, etc. 
 
Step 2 - Imagine the range of extreme ± but still plausible ± achievement of each of the objectives of importance 
to the organization. The extremes should be high and low, under- and over-achievement, poor and good 
performance, etc. 
 
Step 3 - List the factors that could cause these chDQJHV LQ OHYHOV RI DFKLHYHPHQW RI WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V NH\
objectives. For example, an extremely negative cash-flow could be caused by public concern over the safety of 
RQH RI WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V NH\ SURGXFWV RU VHUYLFHV ZKLFK UHVXOWV LQ D VWHS-change downwards in sales of the 
product or service. Conversely, an extremely positive cash-flow could be caused by public concern about a 
FRPSHWLWRU¶V SURGXFW RU VHUYLFH $ OLQH RI TXHVWLRQLQJ VKRXOG EH HQDFWHG WKDW LGHQWLILHV WKH FDXVDO FKDLQ WKDW
results in the extreme achievement, or non-achievement, of a particular key objective. 
 
Step 4 - Consider the extreme achievement of each of the objectives that you have identified. Could another 
plausible causal chain of events result in an equivalent outcome?  If so, pursue a separate line of questioning to 
fully identify that separate causal chain. For example, an extremely negative cash-flow could also be caused by 
a labour force strike which results in a step-change downwards in the production (and therefore sales) of the 
product or service. 
 
Step 5 - Investigate if the achievement and non-achievement of a particular key objective could now, with re-
consideration, be plausibly made more extreme than that identified at Step 2. If so, Steps 3 and 4 should be 
repeated for the more-H[WUHPH DFKLHYHPHQW RI WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V REMHFWLYHV ,I QRW WKH VFHQDULR WHDP
participants should be encouraged to write down explicit reasons as to why this is viewed to be the case. 
 
Step 6 - Inspect each of the causal chains that were created at Steps 3 and 4 and identify the earliest-in-time 
driving forces in each of the chains that are identLILHG'HVLJQDWHHDFKRIWKHVHµLQLWLDWRU¶ driving forces with the 
WLWOHRIDQ µHDUO\ZDUQLQJVLJQDO¶RU µIODJ¶. Note that these flags might designate either (i) particular resolved 
uncertainties, (ii) particular  change to heighten or dampen trends that are already taking place, or (ii) the actions 
of powerful stakeholders who act to preserve or enhance their own interests in the light of unfolding events. 
 
As an example of our BLM HS method in practice, consider the following detailed example of its application 
within the UK education system. 
 
6.1. Integration of the Backwards Logic Method of Scenario Planning and Horizon Scanning in 
Practice  
Recently, many changes have occurred to the strategic landscape in the Higher Education (HE) sector in the UK, 
resulting in increased uncertainty. As a result of this, a UK university wished to consider what may trigger 
potential extreme outcomes for the university in the future, so as to develop contingencies and form mitigating 
strategies. As such, a BLM scenario planning exercise to identify Early Warning Signals of potential extreme 
outcomes was conducted. In step 1 of the process a number of objectives were identified relating to the 
XQLYHUVLW\¶VPRVWUHFHQWVWUDWHJLFUHYLHZ7KHVHLQFOXGHGLPSURYHPHQWLQWKHXQLYHUVLW\¶VVWDQGLQJRQDQXPEHU
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of national and global university rankings, increased recruitment of students, an improved research rating, and 
generation of a financial surplus that can be used for reinvestment. 
 
In step 2 of the process extreme outcomes were imagined for these objectives. In terms of positive outcomes 
deemed to represent extremely good performance, the considered outcomes were, for example i) entering the top 
50 on a particular university ranking considered to be prestigious, and on which the university was currently 
ranked a lot lower than 50 ii) increasing registered student numbers by 25%, representing a very large increase, 
and iii) generating a large financial surplus of 8% for reinvestment in new buildings and infrastructure. In terms 
of negative outcomes deemed to represent extremely bad performance the considered outcomes were, for 
H[DPSOH L WKH XQLYHUVLW\¶V SODFH RQ WKH LGHQWLILHG SUHVWLJLRXV UDQNLQJ VOLSSLQJ WR ORZHU WKDQ  ZKLFK LV
considerably lower than its current ranking ii) the number of registered students falling by more than 10%, and 
iii) the university making a financial loss of greater than 5% of its present turnover.   
 
In step 3, factors that might result in these outcomes were identified. These included i) factors related to recent, 
already-implemented government policy changes specific to the HE sector ii) changes that might take place in 
the future but which have not yet taken place, and (iii) broader and longer-standing issues and trends related to 
the UK economy and demography. An example of a recent policy change specific to the UK HE sector was the 
very recent introduction of a Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) through which to monitor teaching quality 
in UK universities, and which directly impacts university funding by affecting the size of tuition fee the 
university is allowed to charge. An example of broader issues and trends that could impact HE is, to cite the 
PRVW REYLRXV H[DPSOH UDLVHG E\ SDUWLFLSDQWV WKH 8.¶s forthcoming departure from the EU, which raises 
questions in terms of future overseas student numbers, as-well-DV8.XQLYHUVLWLHV¶DELOLW\WRUHFUXLWVWDIIIURP
the EU. 
 
The line of questioning that was used in relation to the extreme outcomes identified in step 2, and how the 
factors identified in step 3 were combined by the participants to consider the causal-chain logic by which the 
extreme outcome might come about, can be illustrated by reference to the extreme outcome of a financial loss of 
greater than 8%. Participants identified a combination of causal factors that might occur simultaneously and 
FRPSRXQG WKH HIIHFW RI HDFK RWKHU WKHUHE\ JUHDWO\ XQGHUPLQLQJ WKH XQLYHUVLW\¶V ILQDQFLDO SRVLWLRQ 6R IRU
example, the recent introduction of the Teaching Excellence Framework was considered to place greater 
emphasis on quality of teaching, requiring that it be allocated more attention and resource, and thereby reducing 
the amount of resource available for conducting large-scale research, which had previously been a source of 
significant income for the university. Furthermore, because of relatively lower-levels of attention paid to 
teaching quality previously, a concerned expressed was that the university might receive a poor rating for 
teaching quality in the then forthcoming first TEF assessment. This would reduce its attractiveness to students, 
who would opt to go to alternative universities instead, thereby reducing the level of tuition fees received by the 
university. These factors were then considered tREHFRPSRXQGHGE\WKH8.¶VGHSDUWXUHIURPWKH(8DQGWKH
8. JRYHUQPHQW¶V UHQHZHG HPSKDVLV RQ UHGXFLQJ LPPLJUDWLRQ ZKLFK UHVXOWHG LQ D SDUDOOHO UHGXFWLRQ LQ WKH
number of overseas postgraduate students ± SUHVHQWO\D NH\VRXUFHRI WKHXQLYHUVLW\¶V LQFRPH The identified 
chain of logic therefore comprised several interacting factors which, when combined, could result in the 
considered extreme outcome ± in this case, a negative one related to the university performing very badly 
financially. 
 
However, in step 4 of the process, participants considered whether this same extreme outcome could occur 
through other means. Alternative causal-chain logic was identified, involving some of the same factors, but 
playing out in a different way, as-well-as incorporating additional causal factors not considered in the initial 
causal chain described above. An example was a further, snap general election, called because of the collapse of 
WKH 8.¶V QRZ PLQRULW\ JRYHUQPHQW ZKLFK UHVXOWHG IURP LWV LQDELOLW\ WR QHJRWLDWH DQ DFFHStable deal for the 
8.¶VGHSDUWXUHIURPWKH(87KHHOHFWLRQWKHQUHVXOWHGLQWKH/DERXU3DUW\IRUPLQJDQHZJRYHUQPHQWZLWKD
large majority, with one of their manifesto policies being the abolition of UK tuition fees, which they then 
implement. However, when doing so, the new Labour government replaces tuition fees with central government 
funding for HE, but the amount of funding is inadequate and does not fully offset the loss in funding from 
tuition fees. This results in an extreme financial loss by alternative means to those originally considered. 
 
Interestingly, in step 5 of the process, participants realised that if this alternative causal-logic did indeed play out 
- and by this point the participants considered it to be highly plausible - it could result in a still more extreme 
outcome than originally conceived in step 2. A significant number of universities could go bankrupt and either 
disappear, or have to be financially bailed out by the government at great cost in terms of their independence 
and reSXWDWLRQ7KHSDUWLFLSDQWVFRQVLGHUHGWKHLURZQLQVWLWXWLRQSRWHQWLDOO\WREHRQHRIWKHµORVHUV¶VKRXOGWKLV
scenario transpire. 
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Indeed, this newly-considered causal logic, resulting in a still more extreme outcome than originally considered, 
was now deemed so plausible that in the final step of the process - step 6 - it was identified that UK HE 
LQVWLWXWLRQV LQFOXGLQJ WKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶RZQRUJDQLVDWLRQ WKURXJKYDULRXVH[LVWLQJFKDQQHOV VKRXOGDOUHDG\EH
lobbying the Labour Party to ensure that any central-government funding that might replace tuition fees would 
more than offset the funding lost by their abolition, and should perhaps even represent an increase in funding, 
since UK universities should be deemed key to refocusing the UK economy in light of Brexit. Herein we see the 
identification of a causal factor related to powerful actors, both in the form of a new and highly popular Labour 
government with a large majority, and in terms of university lobby groups, which might act to both cause a still 
more extreme outcome in the first instance, or, in the case of university lobby groups, might attempt to pre-empt 
and mitigate the possibility for such an extreme outcome. Identified early warning causal factors were, then, an 
increasing stalemate in Brexit QHJRWLDWLRQV RU D IXUWKHU UHGXFWLRQ RI WKH SUHVHQW &RQVHUYDWLYH JRYHUQPHQW¶V
already fragile coalition (with the DUP) majority, perhaps resulting from a lost bye-election, and leading to a 
collapse of the government and a further election.   
 
But, even so, will all weak signals of important extreme futures be monitored? As an additional measure, not 
included in the above case application, we recommend adoption of 0HLVVQHUHWDO¶Vapproach WRµEOLQG-
VSRW GHWHFWLRQ¶. In our adaptation of their so-FDOOHG µ0 VWDNHKROGHU IHHGEDFN¶ PHPEHUVRI DQRUJDQL]DWLRQ
and, importantly, outsiders (whom are likely to have different mental models and viewpoints, but at the same 
time be knowledgeable about the focal organization and its environment) can be asked to identify driving forces 
that could impact the focal organization¶VDFKLHYHPHQWRILWVNH\REMHFWLYHV. If WKHH[WHUQDOH[SHUWV¶UDWLQJVRI
both the impact and uncertainty of a particular factor are significantly higher than those of the internal experts 
then, in Meissner et al.¶VDQDO\VLVDµEOLQGVSRW¶LVSUHVHQWwithin the organization. Meissner et al.¶VLQQRYDWLRQ
essentially provides a means to aggregate elicited knowledge, placing emphasis on bias reduction and, 
importantly, identifying peripheral views (recall our discussion of the inherent difficulty of this task in section 
3.3, above). But the technique assumes that identified trends and causal factors, currently in their infancy, but 
which have only been identified by a minority of expert respondents in the first round of a two-round approach, 
which are then attributed high importance once they have been brought to the attention of the group as a whole 
in the second round, are representative of weak signals. 
 
Importantly, both the BLM and the 3600 stakeholder feedback technique assume that any future which may 
subsequently prove of importance is currently leaving a trace behind in the present and recent past. HS, by itself, 
has no method for identifying important weak VLJQDOVZKLOVWWKH,/VFHQDULRSODQQLQJ¶VLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIVLJQDOV
(i.e., early events in particular causal chains) will not, necessarily, be the important precursors of significant 
futures for a focal organization that can then be monitored in a HS on-going activity. Only the BLM approach to 
scenario development is likely to direct attention to those important signals that may, or may not, already show 
an evidential base in the present or recent past. But, for an organization to be fully prepared for any significant 
future, all of these methods show weaknesses. In such circumstances we recommend that an µantifragile¶
approach is taken by an organization - where the organization actively seeks positions where the down side of 
events is µFOLSSHG¶ or limited but the upside is unlimited. Derbyshire and Wright (2014) give more detail on this 
non-deterministic approach to planning for the future. 
 
The BLM scenario development approach is relatively new but has been recently utilized in the developing of 
scenarios for the future of Botswana (Plakas et al., 2017). Here, one extreme negative scenario was developed 
DQGHQWLWOHGµCaught between a rock and a hard place¶ where the key driving force resolutions were a declining  
income to the country from diamonds and a low level of investment in education. The key weak signals at the 
beginning of the unfolding of this very negative future were identified as a failure of the Botswanian 
government to diversify the economy away from diamonds despite efforts towards expanding tourism in the 
country and foreign direct investment slowing. Another scenario exploration, this time for the future of for 
Zimbabwe, by Belfrage et al. (2017) created a scenario that was named µ<RXFDQ¶WHDWSROLF\¶. At the beginning 
of this extremely negative future, early warning signals were identifies as unfavourable climate for crops, 
instability of rights to land, and insufficient employment to meet demand. In a case study of the use of extreme 
µEUDQFKLQJVFHQDULRV¶, Cairns et al. (in press) identified early warning signals as a weak Australian economy and 
rising oil prices ± that would lead, eventually, to further lack of progress in the regeneration of the Australian 
state of Tasmania. 
 
To further clarify the value of the BLM method of identifying weak signals, consider the case study of the top 
team of a residential mortgage division of a UK-based bank at the end of 2007, as detailed in Wright and 
Goodwin (2009). At this point in time, residential house prices had continued to rise over the previous 15 years 
and, intuitively, house price rises were seen to be a pre-determined of the future ± so much so that the top team 
spent time considering seriously the creation of a new mortgage product ± a multi-generational mortgage 
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product that could be handed down from parents to children, such that a house purchase could be made with the 
future payments of future generations of a family. Imagine, if at that time, the bank had been asked to consider 
its fundamental objects (see step 1 of the process above) and that these were identified as increased market share 
and increased absolute amount lent to house buyers. At step 2, extreme outcomes would have been developed 
VXFKDVµDFROODSVHLQKRXVHSULFHV¶ and µa collapse in the confidence of potentLDOSXUFKDVHUVLQKRXVLQJYDOXH¶. 
At step 3, the causal factors identified would, likely, have been those linked WRµinability of purchasers to pay 
their monthly mortgagH SD\PHQW LQVWDOOPHQWV¶ etc. It is easy to see that the latter driving force could be 
identified, and then utilized, as an early-in-time early warning signal of a very negative scenario for the UK 
bank.  In short, horizon VFDQQLQJDFWLYLW\DURXQGWKLVµIODJ¶ would be worthwhile. 
 
 
7. Conclusion. 
 
In this paper, we have documented the Intuitive Logics approach to scenario development and considered both 
its perspective-broadening and perspective-narrowing attributes. We also analyzed Horizon Scanning as a 
foresight activity and demonstrated that the extant practice-based literature is both vague and unfocussed in 
terms of advice on the identification of important but weak signals. Any integration of already-developed 
scenarios that are produced by the basic Intuitive Logics method with subsequent Horizon Scanning activities is 
likely to lead to inappropriate confideQFH LQ WKH FRPSUHKHQVLYHQHVV RI DQ RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V SUHSDUHGQHVV IRU
possible futures. By contrast, integration of Horizon Scanning activities with the outputs of the Backwards 
Logic method for scenario development will focus the attention of Horizon Scanning on the precursors of 
important extreme futures that could impact the organization and its key objectives. 
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Figure 1: Intuitive Logics Process (Adapted from 2¶%ULHQHWDO5LQJODQG6FKZDUW]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Figure 2: Horizon Scanning Process: Adapted from Miles & Saritas (2012), Neugarten (2006) and Marsh et 
al. (2014) 
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Figure 3: Comparison of Methodologies 
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Figure 4: Integration of Approaches 
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Table 1: Existing Research on the Integration of SP & HS in Practice 
 
 
 
Study 
Case Example Context Method Conducted  
Amanatidou et al. (2012)  
Emerging Science and 
Technology project 
Public Policy Case Study Both 
Boe-Lillegraven & Monterde (2015) Cisco Systems Inc. Technological  Case Study  Both 
Day & Schoemaker(2005) Multiple Contexts Business Strategy  
Conceptual 
Framework/Proposition 
Both 
Garnett et al. (2016) 
Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs 
(Defra) 
Public Policy Case Study  Academic 
Habegger (2010) Three EU Countries Public Policy Comparative Case Study Review 
Ilmola & Kuusi (2006) Energy Company Business Strategy  Case Study Academic 
Kayser & Bierwisch (2016) Social Media Foresight Practices Empirical Academic 
âÀƬ
ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ Metal Processing Industry Foresight Practices Empirical Academic 
Miles & Saritas (2012) Multiple Contexts Health Policy 
Literature 
Review/Critique 
Academic 
Oliver Schwarz (2005) 
Anonymous Company & 
Industry 
Business Strategy  Case Study  Academic 
Palomino et al. (2012) Multiple Contexts Foresight Practices 
Literature 
Review/Critique 
Both 
Palomino, Taylor, Owen & McBridge 
(2012b) 
Multiple Contexts Health Policy 
Literature 
Review/Critique 
Academic 
Pang (2010) Social Media Foresight Practices 
Literature 
Review/Critique 
Academic 
Ramírez, Österman & Grönquist 
(2013) 
Technology & Oil Industry Business Strategy  Case Study Academic 
Rossel (2011) Multiple Contexts Business Strategy  
Literature 
Review/Critique 
Practitioner 
Saritas & Smith (2011) National Context  Public Policy Survey Both 
Schoemaker, Day & Snyder (2013) Security & Defence Business Strategy  Case Study Academic 
Schultz (2006) Multiple Contexts Business Strategy  
Conceptual 
Framework/Proposition 
Practitioner 
Tessun (1997) 
 
Competition in the 
Automotive Industry  
Business Strategy Case Study  Practitioner 
van Rij (2012) Multiple Contexts Foresight Practices 
Literature 
Review/Critique 
Academic 
van Rij (2010) UK, Netherlands & Denmark Public Policy Case Study Practitioner 
Weber, Harper, Könnölä & Barceló 
(2012) 
Future-oriented technology 
analysis (FTA) 
Technological  
Conceptual 
Framework/Proposition 
Practitioner 
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Table 2: Extant Advice on the Identification of Weak Signals 
 
 
 
 
Advice on the Identification of Weak Signals Study 
Environmental Scanning  
 ǲ 
ǳ 
Oliver Schwarz (2005) 
Scenario-based Identification & Environmental Scanning  
 ǲ        -forward its development is 
through scanning the environment and the use of scenario planning 
or other future-mapping techniques (pg. 139) 
Schoemaker, Day & Snyder (2013); âÀƬ
ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ 
Diversity, Discontinuity and Disturbance 
Require Diverse opinions and backgrounds to identify Discontinuity 
& Disruptive Dynamics 
 
van Rij (2010); Miles & Saritas, 2012; 
Habegger (2010); Weber et al. (2012); 
van Rij (2012); Schultz (2006); Saritas & 
Smith (2011), Boe-Lillegraven & 
Monterde (2015) 
Web-Based Scanning, Diverse & Expert Opinion Multiple  
 ǲ
ǤǤǤǳ 
ǲ ǡ      
formal meetings, such as conferences and workshops, and informal 
networking, supplemented by material obtained from the literature 
 ǥ     -based Horizon Scanning 
ȋȌȋǤ ? ? ?Ȍǳ 
ǲǡ
sources such as the internet, news, company reports, consumer 
surveys and employee opinions, which are then continuously 
ȋǤ ? ? ?ȌǤǳ 
Network analysis and web-based approaches to derive potential 
weak signals.  
Amanatidou et al. (2012) 
 
Palomino, Taylor, Owen & McBridge 
(2012b)  
 
 
 
Ramírez, Österman & Grönquist (2013) 
 
 
 
Garnett et al. (2016) 
Social Media, Online Networks & Crowdsourcing  
Twitter and online networks such as FutureMonitor to 
crowdsource potential future trends.  
Pang et al. (2010), Kayser (2016) 
Schoemaker et al. (2013) 
Assume Weak Signals Previously Known 
Provide no advice or assume weak signals are previously known  Ilmola & Kuusi (2006) Tessun (1997), 
Rossel (2011), Palomino et al. (2012) 
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Table 3:  Comparison of standard and backwards logic scenario methods 
 
 
 
 Conventional Intuitive Logics 
Method 
Backwards Logic Method 
Underpinning basis for scenario 
development 
Causality Causality 
Starting point for scenario 
development and focus of 
subsequent HS activity 
Components of the chosen two 
high-impact high-uncertainty 
clusters. 
The (non-) achievement of an 
H[WUHPHLQDQRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VNH\
objective. 
Number of scenarios that are 
developed in detail 
Four One or more 
Focus on stakeholder 
behaviour/reactions in relation to 
unfolding scenario events 
Low High 
 
